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Abstract 
This paper discusses the implementation of automated obstacle detection to British level crossings to 
improve safety, efficiency and reduce costs and analyses how successful this could be. There are over 
6000 level crossings in Britain and they are the largest single risk to the railways; one method to 
improve their safety is by introducing automated obstacle detection. Over the last ten years there 
have been, on average, 9 deaths a year at level crossings (Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2016) 
(excluding suicides), making them a high priority for Network Rail to improve. Obstacle detection 
wouldn’t just help improve the safety of level crossings, but it could also reduce the costs associated 
with level crossing signallers and operators and would lower the waiting times for road vehicles and 
pedestrians. With research also being done into the future possibility of introducing autonomous 
trains to the British railways, the combination of this and the obstacle detection system proposed 
could see a large improvement in safety across the level crossings. 
 
1. Introduction 
Each year, there is an average of 50 accidental deaths on British railways (Office of Rail and Road, 
2016), 9 of which occur at level crossings. A level crossing is a place at which a footpath or road cross 
a railway track. “Collisions at level crossings are the largest single cause of train accident risk” (Rail 
Safety and Standards Board, 2016) and should therefore be a main area to focus on for improving the 
safety of the railway as a whole. 
Introducing automated obstacle detection is a way in which safety could be improved at certain level 
crossings, due to the elimination of human error. Having automated obstacle detection isn’t just about 
knowing whether or not there is an object on the crossing, it is also about communicating a signal to 
the train to indicate the action that should take place. Then, depending on what response the 
detection has, having the technology in place for the train to know how to react under different 
scenarios.  
The addition of obstacle detection wouldn’t just improve safety on the railway for pedestrians, vehicle 
users and train passengers; it could also reduce the costs associated with the need for level crossing 
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signallers and operators. There is also the potential for improved efficiency because of the increased 
train speeds and a reduction in waiting times for pedestrians and vehicles.  
Deciding which level crossings should have automated obstacle detection can be done by analysing 
the various types of level crossings, the risk associated with using them, how often they’re used and 
any incidents, which may have happened in the past.  
The risk associated with using a level crossing has been gradually declining over the last 10 years. 
However, despite these recent trends in level crossing safety, the potential for a single catastrophic 
incident that would skew the figures remains. This could be avoided with the introduction of obstacle 
detection.   
In addition to automated obstacle detection, autonomous trains are also a very real future possibility 
that could come to the British railways. Therefore, it is important to be able to incorporate any final 
design of level crossing obstacle detection, with the possibility that it may need to be used with 
autonomous trains too.  
The various stages to complete the study were; to decide which crossings should be upgraded, which 
barriers would be most suitable, what method of obstacle detection would be most effective and the 
calculation of timings for the closure sequence of these level crossings.  
 
2. State of practice on current solutions 
2.1 Current Level Crossings 
There are two types of level crossings in Britain and they are put into two separate categories, active 
and passive crossings. An active crossing is one that shows the user (pedestrian or vehicle user) that 
a train is approaching by the closure of the crossing and with audible alarms and warning lights. A 
passive crossing doesn’t have any features to show that there is train approaching to the user and 
they are responsible for deciding whether or not it is safe to use the crossing. There are sufficient 
signs and instructions in place to demonstrate how to use passive crossings. These two types of level 
crossings are then divided into various sub-categories, each of these sub-categories have distinct 
characteristics. 
2.1.1. Passive Crossings 
 
User Worked Crossing (UWC/ UWC-T): 
This type of level crossing is usually a gate which either a vehicle user or pedestrian must operate in 
order to get through the level crossing. There are two types of user worked crossings; with and without 
a telephone. The telephones are usually in place where there is poor visibility and it is difficult for a 
user to determine whether or not it is safe to cross. There are also multiple signs in place giving the 
user instructions on how to operate the crossing. The telephones are connected to a signaller who 
must give permission for the user to cross and then the user must also let the signaller know when 
the track is clear on the other side. There is a speed restriction of 125mph for trains at these types of 
crossings in Britain. 
 
Open Crossing (OC): 
An open crossing only has signs to warn drivers to come to a stop before passing these level crossings 
because the area between the road and the rail is completely open. Open crossings are usually located 
on very quiet roads and in order for the vehicle users to pass safely, good visibility is a necessity for 
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this crossing. Trains must slow down to a maximum speed of 10mph before crossing and some even 
stop completely before the level crossing to minimise the risk of a collision. 
 
Footpath Crossing (FP): 
These crossings are designed for the use of pedestrians and not vehicle users; they often have stiles 
or gates in place to reduce usage. There are no warning signals given to the crossing user with most 
of these crossings, however, in some cases where there is low sighting time, a “whistle” board may be 
put in place to make the train driver sound the horn to alert anyone wishing to cross that it isn’t safe 
to do so. It is solely the crossing user’s responsibility for ensuring that it is safe to cross before doing 
so. Similarly to user worked crossings, there are various signs in place to display to users the dangers 
and instructions of using the crossings.  The maximum train line speed for a footpath crossing is 
125mph.  
 
2.1.2. Active Crossings 
There are two different types of active crossings; manual and automatic. A manual crossing has a 
signaller and/or crossing keeper to operate the level crossing. An automatic crossing is activated from 
an approaching train reaching a “strike-in” point and doesn’t rely on humans to operate them. A strike-
in point is the distance back from a level crossing a train is which then initiates the closure sequence 
of the crossing.  
 
Manually Controlled Gate (MCG): 
These crossings have gates that are operated by a crossing keeper or manually by a signaller. At these 
crossings the usual position at which the gates are left is open to road traffic; this is usually done on 
busier roads though. On quieter roads it is often common practice for the gates to remain closed to 
the public and only opened by a crossing keeper after getting confirmation of no trains approaching 
the crossing. The maximum line speed at manually controlled gates is 125mph.  
 
Manually Controlled Barrier (MCB): 
These crossings are very similar to manually controlled gate crossings as they are controlled by a 
signaller or crossing keeper. They have full barriers that extend across the width of the road and 
warning lights and audible sounds are also incorporated within the design of the crossing to let 
pedestrians know of any approaching trains. After the activation sequence of the level crossing starts, 
there are amber warning lights and an audible warning for approximately 3 seconds. This is then 
followed by red flashing lights for 6 seconds, after which, the barriers close. Manually controlled 
barriers have either barriers that cover the width of the road on both sides of the crossing or 2 half 
barriers on both sides of the crossing. It takes 6-8 seconds for the barriers to reach the lowered 
position when the crossing has two full barriers, and takes an additional 6-8 seconds to close the exit 
barriers for the crossings with two half barriers (Rail Safety & Standards Board, 2006). The level 
crossing with two half barriers is designed so that vehicles and pedestrians have more time to leave 
the crossing if they are already on it. After the barriers are fully down the audible warning stops.  
The maximum line speed for manually controlled barriers is 125mph. The average closure time of 
manually controlled barriers is 227 seconds (Rail Safety & Standards Board, 2006). However, if another 
train is approaching, the barriers will remain down as there would be difficulties raising and lowering 
the barriers quickly enough to let vehicles and pedestrians through safely.  
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Manually Controlled Barrier monitored by Closed-Circuit Television (MCB-CCTV): 
These are very similar to the manually controlled barrier previously mentioned, except they are 
monitored with CCTV, which is viewed by a signaller to control the actions of the crossing. The 
maximum line speed of these crossings is 125mph.  
Automatic Half Barrier Crossing (AHB): 
An automatic half barrier crossing has barriers which only extend across the entrance of the road so 
that the exits are left clear. They are an automatic, active crossing meaning that warning lights and 
sounds are automatically activated by an approaching train before the closing sequence of the 
barriers. After the train has passed the level crossing the barriers automatically rise allowing vehicles 
to pass. The time taken between the activation of the closing sequence and the arrival of the train is 
a minimum of 27 seconds. This number varies though as only 50% of trains arrive within 50 seconds 
and 95% of trains arrive within 75 seconds (Rail Safety & Standards Board, 2006). The maximum line 
speed of an AHB crossing is 100mph (Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2016). The short arrival time of 
the train is to discourage vehicle users and pedestrians from “zigzagging”. Zigzagging is a term used to 
describe the action of a driver or pedestrian at an AHB crossing of driving or walking around the 
entrance barrier and then cutting back across to the correct side of the road to pass the level crossing.  
 
Automatic Barrier Locally Monitored (ABCL): 
To pedestrians and road vehicles users this appears to be the same as an automatic half barrier 
crossing, however, the crossing is continuously monitored and the train driver must be sure that the 
Figure 1. Carlton level crossing (MCB-CCTV) 
Figure 2. Collingham level crossing (AHB) 
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crossing is clear before arriving. Trains must slow down to a maximum speed of 55mph before 
reaching the crossing (Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2016).  
 
Automatic Open Crossing Locally Monitored (AOCL): 
This type of crossing has no barriers, but has audible warnings and flashing lights telling vehicle users 
it is unsafe to cross, which are automatically activated when a train is approaching. Road vehicle users 
and pedestrians should only cross when there are no warning signals being provided. The train driver 
must slow down to a maximum of 55mph to ensure that the crossing is clear before advancing. If more 
than one train is approaching the crossing then the lights and warning noise will continue until the 
second train passes.  
 
Footpath Crossing with Miniature Warning Lights (FP-MWL): 
This variation of the typical footpath crossing has similar features. However, the inclusion of red and 
green lights inform the pedestrian whether or not it is safe to cross. The light remains green until a 
train approaches the crossing, at which time the light will turn to red and will stay so until the train 
has passed. The red light could still be showing after a train has gone through which would indicate 
that another train is approaching and it is still unsafe to pass.  
User Worked Crossing with Miniature Warning Lights (UWC-MWL): 
This level crossing has gates or barriers which extend across the whole road or path and the user must 
operate the crossing themselves before crossing. Similarly to a footpath crossing with miniature 
warning lights, there are red and green lights indicating to the user when it is safe to cross. There are 
also signs in place to tell the user how to safely pass the crossing.  
Figure 5 shows that the most common types of level crossings in Britain are footpath and user worked 
crossings. These are both types of passive crossing, so the user has to decide when it is safe to cross. 
There are also level crossings called station footpath or barrow crossings, which have the same 
features as a typical footpath crossing so these are included under that category.  Also, Network Rail 
has recently upgraded numerous MCB-CCTV crossings to manually controlled barriers with obstacle 
detection (MCB-OD) which weren’t included in Network Rail’s online archive, so aren’t in figure 5. 
These types of crossings will be discussed in a later chapter and a spreadsheet of them can be seen in 
Appendix A. 
Figure 3. Eaves Lane level crossing (FP-MWL). From left, miniature warning lights showing it is safe to cross, image of level 
crossing, miniature warning light showing that a train is approaching and it is unsafe to cross.  
6 
 
 
 
2.1.3. Number of Level Crossings 
Network Rail is also currently undergoing a project to close down various level crossings to improve 
the safety of the railway (Network Rail, 2017). Most of the level crossings which have been closed 
are footpath and user worked crossings. The values taken from the archive were from December 
2016 and there are numerous level crossings which are closed but still listed in the archive. An 
Figure 4. Westbrook Lane level crossing (UWC-MWL) 
Figure 6. Barrel Lane level crossing closed down in Sutton-on-Trent 
Figure 5. Graph showing the number of different types of level crossing in Britain, the data was collected from Network 
Rail’s online archive (Network Rail, 2017). Some of the level crossings have been closed down which appear in the data 
so there will be some variation with the actual number of level crossings in Britain and those displayed. 
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example of this is Barrel Lane level crossing, which is shown in the archive but has closed down as it 
can be seen in Figure 6. 
 
2.2 Risks 
Risk in the context of a level crossing is defined as the likelihood of an incident to take place, and its 
severity. There are various risk drivers that Network Rail use to determine how safe a level crossing is 
and whether any action should be taken to improve the safety. The factors that are typically used are: 
• Number of pedestrians 
• Number of vehicles 
• Frequent trains 
• Visibility 
• Deliberate misuse or user error 
• Close to a train station 
• Sun Glare 
• Poor visibility for approaching vehicles & pedestrians 
• Environment 
These aspects of a level crossing, along with any past incidents, are the main criteria as to what the 
risk is with using this level crossing and if anything should be done to improve it.  
 
2.2.1. Fatalities and Weighted Injuries per year 
Instead of just using the number of fatalities to determine how many accidents have occurred at a 
level crossing, Network Rail use “Fatalities and Weighted Injuries per year” (FWI/year). This takes into 
account major and minor injuries, and also cases of shock and trauma.  
 
Injury degree Weighting Number of injuries weighted as 
equal to a fatality 
Fatality 1 1 
Major Injury 0.1 10 
Minor Injury (depends on seriousness 
of injury) 
0.005 200 
0.001 1000 
Shock/ Trauma (depends on 
seriousness of event to cause it) 
0.005 200 
0.001 1000 
Table 1. A table taken from a risk analysis report demonstrating how the severity of injuries are 
weighted against fatalities (Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2016) 
Table 1 explains the number of incidents it would take to have the same weighting as a fatality. For 
example, if there were 10 major injuries in 1 year at level crossings, this would be equivalent to 
1FWI/year.   
 
2.2.2. Risk Profiles 
There are four main risk profiles stated in Network Rail’s Railway Safety Case which categorise how 
each level crossing accident can occur: (Network Rail, 2005) 
• HET-10: A passenger train collides with a road vehicle at a level crossing 
• HET-11: A non-passenger train collides with a road vehicle at a level crossing 
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• HEM-27: A member of the public is struck down by a train at a level crossing 
• HEN-44: A member of the public or a road vehicle is either trapped or struck by the level 
crossing 
These risk profiles show that the types of accidents that occur at level crossings vary between different 
types of crossings. For example, automatic half barrier crossings had an average of 3 FWI/year 
between 1994 and 2005; this was mainly comprised of HET-10 and HEM-27 incidents which account 
for 90% of cases at AHB’s. In comparison to this, manually controlled barrier crossings with CCTV had 
an average of 0.7-1 FWI/year, of which 91% were HEM-27 and HEN-44 incidents, implying that vehicles 
are very rarely involved with accidents at these types of crossing (Rail Safety & Standards Board, 2006).  
 
2.2.3. Individual Risk 
This term is used to describe the risk which applies to only the level crossing users. This risk is highest 
at footpath crossings and user worked crossings. This is because they don’t have any warning of 
incoming trains and it is the pedestrian’s responsibility to be the one to determine whether or not it 
is safe to cross. If there were to be an accident, then the train would remain largely unaffected yet the 
individual would receive severe injuries.  Individual risk is rated from A-M, with A having the highest 
risk and M having almost none at all.  
 
2.2.4. Collective Risk 
This term is used to describe the risk to everyone who is using the crossing: this includes pedestrians, 
vehicle users, and train drivers and passengers. Collective risk is higher at level crossings that have 
more vehicles using them.  
 
 
Types of Level Crossing Average Risk of Level Crossings 
Individual Risk Letter Collective Risk Number 
Automatic Barrier Locally Monitored F 5 
Automatic Half Barrier E 4 
Automatic Open Crossing Locally 
Monitored 
H 6 
Footpath Crossing D 7 
Footpath Crossing with Miniature 
Warning Lights 
D 6 
Manned Barriers H 5 
Manned Barriers monitored by CCTV H 5 
Manned Gates H 7 
Open Crossing G 6 
User Worked Crossing D 8 
User Worked Crossing with Miniature 
Warning Lights 
C 5 
User Worked Crossing with 
Telephone 
C 7 
Table 2. Table with data extracted from the Network Rail archive showing the calculated average risk 
of different types of level crossing (Network Rail, 2017) 
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This is because a collision involving a vehicle would be more likely to lead to injuries and potential 
fatalities for people on the train. The highest collective risk occurs at automatic half barrier crossings, 
this is primarily because they are heavily used by vehicles and are more likely to be involved in a 
collision due to misuse by zigzagging. Collective risk is measured on a scale from 1-13, with 1 having 
the highest risk to everyone and 13 having little to no risk. 
 
Every level crossing has its own individual risk score, and Table 2 shows the average risk calculated 
from all of the individual scores. The spreadsheet with which these values were calculated can be seen 
in Appendix B.  
 
2.2.5. Reducing risk 
The only true way to have no risk at level crossings is to close them down. Since 2010, Network Rail 
has been reducing the number of level crossings on the British network to improve safety. A level 
crossing could be shut down after an extensive risk assessment is carried out. The factors which 
determine whether it should close include; location, traffic and history of past incidents. In many 
locations there is still the need to cross a railway though, so simply closing them down isn’t a valid 
solution. 
There are multiple alternatives which can be done if a level crossing is closed down; these are 
diversions, road bridges, stepped footbridges, ramped footbridges, and underpasses (Network Rail, 
2017). See Appendix C for a list of the proposed level crossing closures by Network Rail. These safety 
measures are not excessively costly for the reduction in risk obtained, making this a very desirable 
option for Network Rail.  
On the 10th April 2016, a train collided with a tractor at a user worked crossing after a signaller “lost 
awareness” and said it was safe to cross (Murphy, 2017). The train was approximately one minute 
away when the tractor driver was told he could use the crossing. The train accident seriously injured 
the tractor driver and 4 passengers also suffered minor injuries. The crossing has now been 
equipped with miniature warning lights to reduce the chance of another collision occurring. Human 
error will always remain a potential hazard and this is a prime example for why more automated 
systems should be in place at level crossings.  
 
Lincoln High Street Level Crossing: 
One case of reducing risk is the level crossing on Lincoln High Street. Every day, the level crossing is 
used by approximately 35,000 people and around 140 trains pass through it (Network Rail, 2017). It 
was originally targeted due to it having the highest case of misuse in the region (Pidluznyj, 2016). 
Network Rail proposed to put a footbridge (with lifts) over the crossing, in an attempt reduce the 
misuse caused by pedestrians who would run across the level crossing as the barriers lower. Having 
the bridge there would allow pedestrians to cross the railway safely while the barriers are down, 
rather than waiting for a train to pass. The plans for it were accelerated after a woman attempted to 
run across as the barriers were closing, resulting in her tripping and being badly injured. The footbridge 
reportedly cost £12 million and opened on the 24th June 2016 (Pidluznyj, 2016).  
Since opening, the bridge experienced problems within the first few months. There were reportedly 
issues with the paving stones coming loose and the lift malfunctioning causing pedestrians to be 
trapped inside (Barker, 2016). This required a lot of maintenance to get it to a standard which was 
safe for the public to use, thus increasing costs.  
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Witnessing first hand, even now when the footbridge is fully functional and safe to use, some 
pedestrians still choose to run across when the audible warning sounds to reach the other side, before 
the barriers close. The bridge is primarily used by pedestrians who reach the level crossing as the 
barriers have just come down. There are also approximately half of the pedestrians who want to pass, 
who still wait by the barriers rather than using the bridge, see Appendix D. As a way to reduce people 
trying to run across the crossing, this method doesn’t appear effective. 
On the 21st April 2017, an elderly person attempted to pass the crossing after the warning lights and 
sounds were activated. However, they didn’t leave enough time to cross and got pinned to the ground 
under one of the barriers (Barker, 2017). This demonstrates that people would still rather risk rushing 
across the level crossing as they are closing, rather than being safe and using the footbridge. Therefore 
this is clearly an ineffective way to reduce the risk at some level crossings.  
 
2.2.6. Risk Statistics 
62% of risk at level crossings is to pedestrians, 92% of pedestrians at risk are members of the public 
using the crossing and the rest are train passengers who have to use a level crossing to get to the 
correct platform at a station. 32% of risk is due to vehicle collisions, 91% of this value affects the people 
in road vehicles and the rest are to train passengers (Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2016).  
In the past 50 years, there have only been 3 cases of a catastrophic event happen at a level crossing 
in Britain (Rail Safety & Standards Board, 2006). These events caused multiple fatalities, including 
passengers on trains, and all involved a train colliding with a road vehicle. The most recent of these 
events happened in 2004 near a village called Ufton Nervet. This was caused by a vehicle driver 
committing suicide by parking on an automatic half barrier crossing. A train collided with the road 
vehicle causing a derailment that resulted in 7 fatalities (BBC News, 2016).   
Automatic half barrier crossings have the greatest number of fatalities and weighted injuries at an 
average of 3 FWI/year, which is a quarter of the entirety of the risk at all level crossings. (MCB-CCTV 
in comparison have an average of 0.7-1FWI/year) (Rail Safety & Standards Board, 2006).  
Over the past ten years there has been a gradual decline in the number of fatalities that have occurred 
at level crossings, although there is variation from year to year. The most recent year recorded saw 
the lowest number of fatalities ever in Britain with only 3. These fatalities occurred at a user worked 
crossing, footpath crossing and manually controlled barrier with CCTV (Rail Safety and Standards 
Figure 7. The footbridge over Lincoln High Street level crossing 
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Board, 2016). For all these fatalities in Figure 8, none of them were passengers on a train and all were 
pedestrians or vehicle users involved in a collision with a train. 
 
 
However, like the event, which occurred in Ufton Nervet, it could just take one vehicle to collide with 
a train to have catastrophic consequences. This is why there is the need for introducing obstacle 
detection, to improve the safety of level crossings and reduce the risk associated with using them. 
 
2.3 Type of Obstacle Detection 
Obstacle detection with an application to level crossings is the ability to determine whether an object 
is on the crossing, and then be able to send a signal to an approaching train so that it can react 
accordingly.  
Automated obstacle detection would ideally be able to do the following: 
• Improve the current safety at level crossings 
• Be accurate and not provide false readings 
• Not cause delays 
• Provide a cost-effective way to save lives 
• Work under a wide range of environmental conditions 
There are numerous methods of obstacle detection that exist; however, not all of them can be applied 
to level crossings. The methods of detection which could potentially be used are CCTV cameras, 
induction loops, LIDAR, radar, infrared thermal imaging and ultrasonic sensors.  
 
2.3.1. Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) 
These are currently in place at many level crossings across Britain and most countries with railways 
too. They aren’t typically used for automated obstacle detection and more for monitoring traffic, 
preventing and detecting crime and also to witness any level crossing violations. However, they could 
be used in conjunction with computer algorithms to determine if an object is present on the track. 
Figure 8. The number of fatalities that have occurred at level crossings over the past 10 years 
(excluding suicide) (Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2016) 
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This could be a cost-effective option since CCTV cameras are already a part of the rail infrastructure. 
These cameras however, are limited in some capabilities. For example, CCTV cameras rely on it being 
light to pick up objects, so when it’s dark they wouldn’t be effective for detection.  
 
2.3.2. LIDAR 
LIDAR stands for laser image detection and ranging. It works by sending out and receiving laser pulses 
that reflect off objects; these reflected laser pulses are used to determine whether or not an object is 
present on the level crossing. The time taken for the laser pulse to return determines the location of 
an object. The direction and speed of an object can also be found by the qualities of the reflected 
pulses (Rail Safety & Standards Board, 2006). 
Lidar uses light waves which have a shorter wavelength than radio waves meaning that this method 
should be able to determine an objects size more accurately than radar. The angle at which the lasers 
are emitted can be varied to cover a specific area and, unlike radar, background objects such as 
barriers can usually be masked out during installation so aren’t picked up by the detector. 
 
 
2.3.3. Radar 
Radar can be used in two ways to detect objects at a level crossing; the first method involves 
transmitting radio waves over the detection zone. If an object is present this will produce “echoes” 
which are received and indicate the presence of something on the crossing. If no echo is received then 
this will imply that the level crossing is clear. By analysing features of the returned “echo” it is possible 
to find the speed, distance and location of an object. 
Figure 9. CCTV camera monitoring Cromwell Lane level 
  
Figure 10. An example of the different scanning angles that LIDAR can achieve 
(Rail Safety & Standards Board, 2006) 
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The second method of detection involves a radar beam becoming interrupted by the presence of an 
object. On one side of the crossing, a radar beam would be emitted to a transceiver on the other side, 
if an object were to interrupt this beam by being in its path; it wouldn’t be received by the transceiver 
indicating the presence of an object. Multiple beams would need to be used to cover the area of a 
level crossing and more may be needed depending on its size. 
 
2.3.4. Infrared Thermal Imaging 
Thermal cameras form an image from infrared radiation, in a similar way in which a CCTV camera uses 
visible light to form an image. The images are formed from slight temperature differences between 
objects and can be used at day and night and in all weather conditions unlike CCTV (Figure 12).  
Thermal cameras would be able to detect if a vehicle has stopped on the level crossing or if anyone is 
trespassing after the barriers have come down. Unlike other sensors such as LIDAR and radar, a 
signaller is still able to see with this technology if an object is on the track. This could allow an effective 
transition from a manned barrier level crossing to a fully-automated one as a human could overlook 
the system during a trial to see how successful it would be.  
 
 
 
Figure 12. An image captured by thermal imaging which shows a clear 
contrast between pedestrians and vehicles with the background (FLIR, 
 
Figure 11. A Radar/ LIDAR detctor being used at a level 
crossing in East Sussex (Rail Engineer, 2015) 
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Infrared thermal cameras have many benefits with respect to level crossings over other methods of 
detection. They can produce high quality images which, with computer algorithms, can be optimised 
for automated detection which is a problem with CCTV. Thermal imaging cameras also have the 
opportunity to have different lenses installed which can enhance the camera view depending on 
where the level crossing is located and how the camera is mounted. 
They are also easy to install, and can be done so on existing infrastructure. In addition to this, infrared 
thermal imaging cameras are designed for harsh environments and are effective in various climates. 
With advancing computer technology, thermal imaging cameras can also detect and differentiate 
between pedestrians and vehicles which could influence what action is needed to be taken if an object 
is trapped on the level crossing. Some thermal cameras have automated detection already built into 
them which could be utilised by Network Rail. An issue with thermal imaging is that it would not be 
able to detect an object the same temperature as the background, such as materials that have fallen 
from the back of a vehicle. Statistically, the chances of this causing a derailment, damage or injury are 
very small. This is because the biggest cause of collisions are between the train and vehicles and 
pedestrians.  
 
2.3.5. Ultrasonic Sensors 
These are designed to detect an object by the change in the frequency of sound waves caused by the 
reflection from the surface of an object. The system emits ultrasonic sound pulses which are above 
the frequency which can be heard by human ears. When the pulse reaches an object, the surface of 
the object reflects the sound. In a level crossing application they need to be suspended above the 
crossing facing down in order to be effective. Multiple ultrasonic sensors would need to be used in 
order to cover the whole area of the crossing. The sensors would be close to overhead lines meaning 
that they would generally be difficult to install and maintain. Also, because the sensors would be 
visible to the public more than other obstacle detection methods, they are more likely to be 
vandalised.  
Ultrasonic sensors are often used in the automotive industry for car parking sensors. Some issues are 
involved with the use of this type of detection, a build-up of either ice or dirt could restrict the 
performance and any static objects that are currently on the level crossing like the rails and barriers 
could also be potentially picked up by the sensors. 
 
2.3.6. Induction Loops 
Induction loops consist of a coil transmitter and receiver which are arranged to create an 
electromagnetic field. When a metallic object enters this field, it disrupts it, and this produces a 
current which is fed to a processor that determines the size and speed of a metallic object present 
(Rail Safety & Standards Board, 2006). The nature of this method of detection means that it only 
detects vehicles and can’t detect pedestrians or other non-metallic objects on the level crossing.  
All of these methods of detection could be effective in reducing the risk at level crossings. Using a 
combination of two of these different techniques would most likely yield the best results as this 
would make the overall detection more reliable and accurate. 
 
2.4 Obstacle Detection Trails in Other Countries 
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There are various methods of obstacle detection which have been tested in other countries which 
could be applied to British railways. However, there are different conditions in these other countries 
such as pedestrian use and weather. There are also different motivations for introducing obstacle 
detection to level crossings; these reasons include making trains more efficient and to reduce the costs 
associated with level crossing signallers and operators.  
 
2.4.1. Germany 
Germany first trialled obstacle detection on 70 different level crossings and used radar detectors. 
Since introducing it, there have been no known instances of objects going undetected, but there were 
some cases of false positives occurring. The main reason for the German railways to introduce obstacle 
detection wasn’t primarily to improve safety but rather the economic benefits (Rail Safety & Standards 
Board, 2006). The level crossings upgraded are the equivalent of manual barrier or gated crossings in 
Britain. Germany also thought that there was an economic preference to replace automatic half 
barrier crossings with grade separation schemes such as bridges and underpasses where possible. 
The overall cost of upgrading each level crossing was approximately €100,000, half of this cost was for 
the installation and interfacing with existing equipment and the other half was for the cost of 
equipment, this gave a financial payback of about 2 years (Rail Safety & Standards Board, 2006). The 
radars were calibrated to detect vehicles, cyclists and “adult-sized” pedestrians but not smaller 
children and animals. This is because there have been no accidents that have involved small children 
and ignoring smaller objects means that fewer false positives will occur.  
 
 
The barrier lowering sequence activates the radar scanner, if an object is detected then a message is 
sent to the train alerting the driver that something is on the crossing, so they can take suitable action. 
If something is found to be on the crossing then the exit barriers are raised to let anything trapped 
out. Level crossings with obstacle detection require annual maintenance and the expected lifetime of 
the obstacle detection is approximately 20-25 years (Rail Safety & Standards Board, 2006).  
 
Figure 13. A Radar detector in place at one a German level crossing 
(ACBahn, 2013) 
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2.4.2. Italy 
Italy has used radar obstacle detection at various level crossings, this was mainly done to minimise 
human error and workload and to also reduce the operating costs. Italy, similarly to other countries, 
has only focussed to prevent catastrophic events from occurring so the obstacle detection is designed 
to detect only large objects, such as vehicles. Pedestrians who are on the level crossing when the radar 
is activated should not intentionally be detected as the minimum detection size has been set at 0.5m³ 
to avoid false positives. There have been some problems reported with the radar, in heavy rain there 
have been issues with detection and there has been “stability problems of the signal from the antenna 
of the radar” (Rail Safety & Standards Board, 2006).  
 
2.4.3. The Netherlands 
The initial obstacle detection trials in the Netherlands were done at 2 different sites, they were first 
considered after problems with cars “zigzagging” and road traffic queuing on the crossing. Grade 
separation schemes were considered but they were seen as a very expensive compared to level 
crossings, and in some areas there is insufficient space. The trials carried out were to see if obstacle 
detection could be effective for a quad-gate crossing with skirt; their appearance is similar to that of 
a British manually controlled barrier with CCTV. The first trial used a combination of radar detection 
and induction loops between the rails and level crossing barriers. Only vehicles were designed to be 
detected but some adult sized pedestrians were inadvertently picked up too. The radar detection was 
activated as the barriers closed, if an object was detected then the entrance barriers would still close 
but the exit barriers would remain open to provide enough time for the crossing user to exit. After the 
barriers close, the radar is turned off and obstacle detection is then just carried out by only induction 
loops. If a vehicle is found to be on the track at this point then the train driver would be signalled and 
the emergency brakes would be applied. 
Originally, the strike-in time for these crossings before being upgraded was 25 seconds and the strike-
in point was around 1km. After the upgrade these values were increased to 42 seconds and 1.6km 
respectively (Rail Safety & Standards Board, 2006). This new system was proven to avoid train-vehicle 
collisions, but there was a downside to this upgrade. Due to the increase in strike-in time, a number 
of pedestrians reportedly attempted to go over the barriers, to quickly pass the crossing. These people 
were detected and caused an approaching train to stop; this caused delays and a potential risk for 
train passengers due to heavy braking.  
Due to these trains being delayed due to braking, another trial was carried out with different criteria. 
In this second trial there was no communication whatsoever between the detector and the train. 
Instead, if the obstacle detection showed that there was an object on the track the only action that 
happened was that the exit barrier is raised. As this detection method doesn’t lead to the train slowing 
Figure 14. Netherlands level crossing with radar detection (UIC, 2013)  
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or stopping, the strike-in time remained the same as it originally was (25 seconds) which was designed 
to reduce the number of pedestrians crossing when the barriers are lowered.  
 
2.4.4. Sweden 
Sweden first introduced obstacle detection in the 1990’s to around 100 level crossings. This was 
primarily done so that the line speeds of the railways could be increased. The obstacle detection 
Sweden used was induction loops because alternatives were not around at the time. If an object is 
detected on the level crossing the Swedish system has 2 responses, the first is that the lowering of the 
exit barriers is limited to 45° to let any trapped vehicle to escape, the second is for the train to brake 
(Rail Safety & Standards Board, 2006).  
Sweden experienced some problems with the introduction of induction loops. Some of them were 
subject to electromagnetic interference and the vibrations caused by the train also interfered with the 
detection signal. This was improved by turning off the induction loops once the barriers are fully 
lowered. The obstacle detection was introduced to high speed lines in Sweden and there haven’t been 
any recorded incidents at those level crossings since. There have, however, been incidences of trains 
coming to a stop at level crossings, but it isn’t known whether these were false positives or actually 
prevented a collision from happening. 
    
2.4.5. Japan 
Over half of all railway accidents that occur in Japan happen at a level crossing. There are 
approximately 2000 level crossings in Japan and of that number, around 700 have been installed with 
obstacle detection. They currently use two different types of obstacle detection; induction loops and 
optical beam sensors, which are the most commonly applied. Japan’s attitude towards level crossing 
safety is to avoid larger collision events such as trains hitting vehicles. Therefore, the detection used 
is primarily there to detect vehicles and not pedestrians. Optical beam sensors have some issues, they 
can become unstable in periods of heavy snowfall, they require daily maintenance to get rid of any 
stains and they often detect pedestrians causing trains to stop.  
Japan also looked into other options rather than just obstacle detection to improve the safety of their 
level crossings. Grade separation schemes such as bridges and underpasses have been considered, 
there has also be attention given to other safety measures including; emergency buttons for crossing 
users, improvements to crossing barriers and alarm devices, introducing crossing watchmen and 
more.  
 
2.4.6. USA 
The USA has trialled three different types of obstacle detection for level crossings: they have used 
laser and video imaging, radar and a combination of infrared and ultrasonic detectors (Rail Safety & 
Standards Board, 2006).  
The laser and video imaging detection was done with a double, infrared, digital camera system which 
had a high-sensitivity, and a three-dimensional laser scanner used with a high-speed rotating camera. 
These two devices gather the same information but work independently to improve the reliability of 
the detection. The combination of these methods meant that there was no disturbance to operations, 
high resolution was achieved and it had low sensitivity due to weather and damage. This method 
achieved a 97% success rate for the USA, the failures were due to one missed detection and one false 
positive.  
The radar system used was a single unit and placed on one side of the crossing; the unit emits pulses 
of radio waves and then “listened” for the echoes from objects. This trial wasn’t as much of a success 
18 
 
as the first; it couldn’t operate dynamically meaning it couldn’t detect moving objects. Only 65% of 
static detections were a success, 24% were false alarms and the rest were missed by the detector (Rail 
Safety & Standards Board, 2006). The false alarms were caused by pedestrians who were detected 
close to the crossing but not actually using it. 
The last trial of using a combination of passive infrared and ultrasonic detectors was done by 
suspending the sensors above the crossing pointing downwards towards the tracks. 12 sensors were 
used in total to improve the accuracy of the results. 98.5% of the results were a success; the only time 
the detector didn’t work effectively was the missed detection of a motorbike (Rail Safety & Standards 
Board, 2006). 
 
2.5 Current Obstacle Detection used in Britain 
Over the last couple of years Network Rail has started to introduce obstacle detection to some British 
level crossings. Every level crossing which has had obstacle detection included looks like a MCB-CCTV 
crossing. They have full barriers that extend across and close off the road and footpaths, both 2 full 
barriers and 4 half barriers have been used in this application. A signaller is still required for these 
crossings but a traditional CCTV camera has instead been replaced with a combination of both radar 
and LIDAR sensors. In addition to this, the barriers are also fitted with “skirts” that stop anyone from 
going under the barriers to get to the other side (Network Rail, 2016).  
These new level crossings are called Manually Controlled Barriers with Obstacle Detection (MCB-OD). 
A signal is shown to the train driver that it is safe to proceed after the crossing has closed and the 
obstacle detection shows that the crossing is clear. The signaller at these crossings no longer has 
access to CCTV footage of the crossing or direct observation and must instead rely purely on the LIDAR 
and radar sensors.  
A key feature of the MCB-OD is that the closing sequence of the barriers is automatically initiated 
when a train hits a predetermined strike-in point. The strike-in point is far back enough so that the 
train can stop before the protecting signal; which provides the information on whether or not the 
crossing is clear.  
 
 
 
Most of the features of the MCB-OD are automated including the lowering, stopping the lowering of 
the barriers if something is detected, and the raising of the barriers. However, the signaller is still 
provided with the function to raise and lower the barrier if the obstacle detection shows that an object 
Figure 15. Polegate Crossing, MCB-OD (Rail Engineer, 
2015)  
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is on the level crossing. The signaller can raise and lower the barriers until the detection shows that 
nothing is on the crossing. If the detection keeps showing a positive detection then a team from 
Network Rail will arrive swiftly to determine what is happening at the crossing.    
 
2.6 Autonomous Trains 
An autonomous train means that a driver would not be required for any of the operations of a train 
to be carried out as normal. Trains are on a fixed track so they would appear to be more suited for 
autonomy than road vehicles, yet it is in that area where most of the focus is. Autonomous trains are 
currently used in some applications, for example, the Docklands Light Railway (DLR) is a fully 
automated train service that runs on the London Underground. This however, is a network that is on 
highly protected infrastructure and is low speed in comparison to Britain’s Mainline Network (Rail 
Technology Magazine, 2014).  
 
 
Some rail companies have proposed driverless trains with the intention that they would “avoid 
conflicts at junctions and allow more frequent services to run on the network” (politics.co.uk, 2017). 
However, the Rail Drivers’ Union has completely disregarded the thought of having autonomous trains 
on the network and they are adamant that trains will always need to have a driver.  
In contrast to this, Deutsche Bahn (German Railways) have said that they want to have introduced 
long-distance, autonomous trains by 2023 (Hars, 2016). For current autonomous railways, like the 
DLR, there is very little intelligence on the actual train itself and instead it is the infrastructure and a 
centralised controller which determines the actions of the train. On long-distance high speed trains 
though, most of the controls would need to be on the trains themselves as it would be too costly to 
upgrade hundreds of miles of railway infrastructure. However, it would be beneficial at high risk areas 
such as level crossings, to have some increased safety measures to reduce the likelihood of an 
incident.  
There are various arguments for and against introducing fully autonomous trains to the entirety of the 
railway network in Britain. In the year 2015/2016, there were 28 reports of shock and trauma at level 
crossings, most of which affected train drivers who witnessed accidents or near misses. By replacing 
the driver with an autonomous system this number would be reduced drastically, as there would be 
no one to be there to see such incidents happen. A main “advantage of self-driving trains does not lie 
so much in cost reduction but in the ability to increase network capacity” (Hars, 2016). This is because 
trains would be able to take more frequent journeys at shorter distances. Another reason why 
Figure 16. A train on the DLR line on the London 
Underground (Evening Standard, 2012) 
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autonomous trains would be beneficial with respect to level crossings is the reduction in reaction time. 
Currently, if a driver is told of an obstruction on a level crossing they are signalled and told to come to 
a stop, before the brakes are applied there is the time taken for the driver to react to the situation. 
Without a driver, this reaction time wouldn’t exist, meaning that the strike-in time can be reduced for 
level crossings. Therefore, they can be closed for a shorter length of time, reducing waiting times for 
pedestrians and vehicle users.  
There are some issues with not having a driver on the train, typically the driver is the front-line 
mechanic if something goes wrong and has the ability to override the system to ensure that any types 
of train failures can be overcome (Rail Technology Magazine, 2014). In addition to this, having a driver 
that is human means that they can adapt to most situations, which an autonomous system would only 
be able to achieve with very advanced algorithms.  
The introduction to autonomous trains is still some years away and in order for it to be a success the 
infrastructure needs to be designed to accommodate for this, in order to protect people and vehicles 
(Rail Technology Magazine, 2014). However, autonomous trains could be very beneficial to the 
introduction of automated obstacle detection at level crossings as they “could significantly lower 
costs, increase capacity and flexibility” (Hars, 2015). Since long-distance, autonomous trains are more 
of an idea at the moment for British railways, there could be the inclusion of a feature on a train that 
causes automatic braking, if the obstacle detection has picked something up on a level crossing. A 
system like this could even start the transition of Britain’s trains from manned to driverless. 
 
3. Potential Solutions 
3.1. Chosen Obstacle Detection Method 
After evaluating all of the research of obstacle detection it appears that using a combination of 
infrared thermal cameras and LIDAR sensors would have the most successful result. Radar has seen 
much success in the past but LIDAR is more accurate due to the shorter wavelength of light; in addition 
to this it would also be very beneficial to visually monitor the level crossing by using a thermal infrared 
camera. CCTV would also be possible for this but there are various advantages that thermal cameras 
have over traditional cameras that are currently used to monitor level crossings. Infrared thermal 
imaging cameras are unaffected by sun glare, headlights, shadows and can be used during the night 
as they rely on heat rather than light. In addition to this, computer algorithms can detect objects with 
a thermal imaging camera much more accurately and reliably than CCTV as there is a greater contrast 
between vehicles and pedestrians with the background. Some infrared thermal cameras have 
automated detection software already in place making them even more advantageous over CCTV. The 
artificial intelligence which monitors these infrared images can become more sophisticated over time 
without having to replace the actual cameras themselves.  
There are limited trials on these methods of detection in other countries but that is because these 
technologies have only recently become advanced enough to be used in this application. They have 
had very successful trials in other applications of obstacle detection.  
The use of infrared thermal cameras would not only provide detection but unlike LIDAR and radar, 
which are currently used for obstacle detection by Network Rail, it would also provide video footage 
of any incidents or misuse that could be later viewed. This would also help with prosecution, if any 
offences take place, as the thermal camera would be able to see the exact nature of what is happening 
at the level crossing. This footage could also allow a signaller to still operate the level crossing if the 
automated system stopped working as they’d be able to see if it was clear or not. Until autonomous 
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trains appear on British railways, a signaller could still do some of the operations, similar to the MCB-
OD, but when trains become automated this could become a fully automated system of detection. 
Thermal imaging cameras can also be acquired for prices a lot lower than the current radar detectors 
that Network Rail use (Rail Safety & Standards Board, 2006).  
Due to issues in other countries with false positives, it is logical to have the obstacle detection set to 
only pick up on objects that are larger than a small child (over 1 metre). This is due to there not being 
a single reported incident of a young child who has been alone and been involved with a collision with 
a train at a level crossing. With recent advancements in thermal technology however, it could be 
possible to determine what object is actually trapped on the crossing, irrelevant of size.  
 
3.2. Barriers 
In order for obstacle detection to be fully effective at level crossings, full barriers that cover the 
entrance and exit separately must be used instead of a half barrier. One of the main features of an 
AHB crossing are the short strike-in times, which are a minimum of 27 seconds. If an object was stuck 
on the crossing the approaching train wouldn’t be able to stop in time to avoid a collision if the train 
was travelling at full speed. The way around this would be to increase the strike-in distance, thus 
increasing the waiting time for vehicles and pedestrians at the crossing. This would, however, lead to 
an increase in the misuse of automatic half barrier crossings as more vehicles and pedestrians would 
“zigzag” over the crossing to avoid waiting; similarly to what happened in the Netherlands’ trial. 
 
 
Another problem with introducing obstacle detection at an AHB crossing is that without the addition 
of full barriers, vehicles and pedestrians could easily cross over after the barriers are down, which 
could lead to a positive detection and the train would need to brake to avoid an incident. A way to 
counteract this could be by only having the obstacle detection active for the first few seconds after 
the barriers are down. If vehicles and pedestrians then decided to pass the crossing, they wouldn’t be 
detected and wouldn’t cause the train to stop. However, this could still lead to a collision so it would 
be most advantageous for any level crossing with obstacle detection to have full barriers. Having the 
obstacle detection active for the first few seconds with full barriers would also be more beneficial 
rather than leaving it on the whole time the barriers are down. It would reduce the number of false 
positive readings due to people jumping over the barriers and would still pick up objects that are 
trapped on the crossing.  
 
Figure 17. Left: The current setup at Collingham level crossing (AHB). Right: Edited image showing barriers on both sides of 
the road for the introduction of obstacle detection 
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Automatic half barrier crossings have had the most fatalities for vehicle occupants at level crossings 
so it seems more feasible to upgrade these crossings to full barriers, as this alone could reduce the 
number of fatalities at level crossings across Britain. Also, the maximum speed a train can travel 
through an AHB crossing is 100mph but for a crossing with full barriers, a train could go through at 
125mph. Therefore, trains could be more efficient as they would be able to reach their destination 
faster and so could run more frequently. However, this can only be applied to cases where the level 
crossing is the constraint on line speed.  
 
3.3. Level Crossings to Upgrade 
 
Figure 18. A flowchart to show a generic outline of what should happen at each current type of level 
crossing 
 
Figure 18 shows which level crossings would ideally be upgraded to level crossings that have full-
barriers and have obstacle detection implemented. Every AHB and ABCL crossing should be upgraded 
to have full barriers as this alone should reduce the risk associated with using them.  
Having obstacle detection implemented at manned barriers and gates may not necessarily improve 
the safety of them, but it would reduce the operating costs as members of staff wouldn’t be required 
to use the barriers. In some instances though, it would be logical to close many of these manned gates 
and barriers down. For example, Grassthorpe Lane is a manned gate level crossing with a crossing 
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keeper, it has an average of 8 vehicles and 3 pedestrians a day use it. There are various other locations 
within a mile of this level crossing that would allow pedestrians and vehicles to cross such as MCB-
CCTV crossings and bridges. By removing manned gate crossings that are rarely used (under 30 
vehicles a day) and replacing the rest with full-barrier crossings with automated obstacle detection, 
should see a large reduction in cost over time for Network Rail who has to employ staff to manually 
operate these crossings. Also, manned gates can only be used during set times during the day when a 
member of staff is there to operate the crossing for users, so by either replacing them or eliminating 
them would give road users and pedestrians more freedom to cross the railway.  
Footpath, user worked and open crossings would be left alone for the introduction of obstacle 
detection. This is because of the lack of use of most of these crossings; many footpath crossings in 
Britain are only used by 1 pedestrian a day and the benefits of upgrading these aren’t worth the large 
costs. In numerous places there are also many space constraints and barriers simply would not fit 
where many footpath crossings are.  
Open crossings would have sufficient space to include full barriers, but for the amount they’re used it 
doesn’t appear feasible to have obstacle detection. Each day, on average, an open crossing is used by 
approximately 147 vehicles and 30 pedestrians which may suggest obstacle detection could be 
suitable. However, there are an average of 7 trains a day using open crossings and over 50% of open 
crossings have fewer than 5 trains pass them every day. In addition to this, there are low line speeds 
of 10mph at open crossings; therefore these crossings should not have obstacle detection equipped 
as the chances of a collision are very small.  
 
Which Level Crossings should be upgraded to include obstacle detection? 
Introduce Obstacle Detection Leave 
Type of Crossing Number Type of Crossing Number 
Automatic Barrier Locally 
Monitored 
124 Automatic Open Crossing 
Locally Monitored 
31 
Automatic Half Barrier 434 Footpath Crossing 2571 
Manually Controlled Barrier 181 Footpath Crossing with 
Miniature Warning Lights 
88 
Manually Controlled Barrier 
monitored by CCTV  
514 Open Crossing 46 
Manually Controlled Gate 128 User worked Crossing with 
Miniature Warning Lights 
104 
  User worked Crossing with 
Telephone 
1727 
User worked Crossing 
without Telephone 
463 
Total 1381 Total 5030 
Table 3. An approximation of the level crossings which should and should not be upgraded to have 
automated obstacle detection 
Approximately 1400 level crossings under this criteria could be effectively upgraded to have obstacle 
detection (Table 3). This number of 1381 level crossings would vary though, depending on individual 
circumstances at each of the level crossing sites.  
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Although obstacle detection would be an effective way to mitigate the risk at level crossings, it 
would still be safer to replace crossings with grade separation schemes, if possible. With cost-benefit 
analysis, this method provides the best reduction in risk against cost; therefore this is a desirable 
project for Network Rail to keep pursuing. 
 
4. Evaluation of Potential Solutions 
4.1. Timings (Initial Stages after Strike-in point) 
Scenario 1: No obstacle detected: 
The first situation that could occur is the most ideal situation, this would be when the level crossing 
barriers are down and the obstacle detection would not pick up an object on the crossing. This would, 
in turn, relay a message to the train saying it is clear to pass and can continue at the normal speed. 
The longest that this should take would be approximately an additional 24 seconds, meaning that the 
total time from the start of the closure sequence to the train reaching the crossing would be about 54 
seconds.  
 
Stage Number Description Time Taken (s) 
1 Train hits the strike-in point continuing at full speed 0 
2 Amber Warning Lights & sound 3 
3 Red Warning Lights & sound 4-6 
4 Barriers on the left-hand side of the road (entrance) 
descend to the lowered position 
6-8 
5 Remaining barriers then lower 8-10 
6 Obstacle Detection on the crossing 3 
7 Scenario 1, 2 or 3 ~ 
Table 4. The initial stages in what will happen when the train approaches a level crossing 
Scenario 2: Primary detection: 
In this scenario, the initial obstacle detection in the last stage of Table 4 would come up with a positive 
reading indicating the presence of an object on the crossing. In this case, the exit barriers would open 
simultaneously with a signal being relayed to the train to apply the brakes. The exit barriers would be 
up for 3 seconds to allow whatever is trapped inside to have an opportunity to escape. The exit barriers 
would then lower again, and the obstacle detection would once again be activated. If the obstacle 
detection shows that nothing is on the track then the train can accelerate after its reduction in speed 
before the level crossing. This leads to a maximum additional closing time of approximately 41 seconds 
so the train would reach the crossing within 71 seconds of the activation of the closure sequence.  
 
Scenario 3: Primary and Secondary detection: 
After the barriers are down, the obstacle detection would give a positive result meaning the train 
should apply the brakes and the exit barriers would open to allow any trapped object out. After the 
barriers have been up for 3 seconds they will then close and obstacle detection will be activated once 
again. If this detection shows another positive result, this will relay a message to the train to come to 
a full stop before the crossing. The time taken in this scenario, from the initiation of the closure 
sequence of the level crossing, to when the train comes to a full stop before the crossing is 
approximately 77 seconds. The most similar type of crossing to the type proposed is a manually 
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controlled barrier, which has an average closure time around 227 seconds so these calculated values 
are a large improvement. 
 
Figure 18 shows the speed of a train, originally travelling at 125mph, experiencing the three scenarios 
previously mentioned. In each case, the speed of the train is identical up until 30 seconds, as this is 
the maximum time from when the amber warning lights activate to the barriers closing and the 
obstacle detection taking place. The black line which is just above 3000m is the distance from the 
strike-in point to the level crossing itself. The gradient of the lines correspond to the speed that the 
train is travelling. It can be seen that in ‘Scenario 3’, the gradient of the line becomes smaller and 
reaches zero just under the black line meaning the train has stopped before the crossing. An 
estimation of the arrival times for varying speeds of train can be seen in Appendix E.  
This is only an approximation of times; there are many factors that could influence the time taken for 
the train to reach the crossing. This includes the weather and the weight of the train. The value used 
for deceleration was also an estimate and will vary for different types of trains.    
 
4.2. Strike-in Distance 
 
The strike-in distances were calculated from the time it would take a train to come to a full stop 50m 
from the level crossing, which is a requirement stated from the ORR (Office of Rail Regulation, 2011). 
The maximum strike-in distance that would be enforced would be just over 3000m from the level 
crossing site. This should enable enough time for the barriers to lower and obstacle detection to 
activate, then from there, the time taken for the train to come to a full stop before reaching the level 
crossing. The value of deceleration used for the train was 12% of acceleration due to gravity 
(approximately 1.1892m/s²) which is used as a general principle. However, the effects of leaves on the 
line can reduce this figure, so areas around level crossings should be a priority for vegetation 
clearance.  
The speed reduction to a third of the train’s original speed was done as this gives sufficient time for 
the train to reach this speed as the second cycle of obstacle detection is being completed. Rather than 
Figure 18. A graph showing the nature of a train travelling 125mph after it hits the strike-in point of a level crossing 
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have a specified distance from each level crossing to initiate the closure sequence of the crossing, it 
should be dependant of the speed of the train approaching instead. This would be more effective with 
an automated train as it would be able to determine the precise time for the closure sequence to start 
rather than having a driver who wouldn’t be able to react as quickly.  
 
 
There is a linear relationship between the strike-in distance and the train speed up to 80mph (Figure 
19) . This is because, at 80mph and lower, a train can sufficiently reach a third of its original speed 
during the time it takes the barriers to reopen and close (approximately 21 seconds). For trains faster 
than 80mph, the time it takes to reduce their speed to a third is longer than 21 seconds. Therefore, 
the distance it takes to reach this reduction in speed, increase as the train gets faster. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This study has demonstrated that the combination of methods involving thermal imaging, LIDAR and 
full barriers would provide a safe transition from current level crossings to an automated level crossing 
that wouldn’t require a signaller to control the barriers.  
In some circumstances, introducing obstacle detection would not be sufficient to stop a collision from 
happening; suicide is a prime example of this. For this to happen someone could simply jump over the 
barriers as a train was approaching and the train would not be able to stop in time. However, for 
people who may have fallen on the crossing or for vehicles that are stuck, automated obstacle 
detection would be very effective in reducing the chances of a collision.  
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In order for obstacle detection to be effectively introduced and incorporated to level crossings with 
the suggested method, it must be done so with full barriers. Having half barriers would result in greater 
risk and potential injury to passengers as heavy braking would be a more regular occurrence by trains, 
due to an increase in detections with vehicles and pedestrians zigzagging.  
Automated trains won’t become a common mode of transport on British railways for years to come, 
therefore having a means of visually observing a level crossing as well as this acting as obstacle 
detection seems to be the best way forward for the current British railways. 
 
6. Further Work 
As a future work it’d be to interest to test this proposed system on a level crossing in a controlled 
environment. The system should be set up to be completely automated but should be monitored 
through the infrared thermal camera to see the effectiveness of the system. Various sized objects 
should pass over the level crossing varying from smaller animals, adult-sized pedestrians to large road 
vehicles. The system would ideally filter out smaller animals to hopefully reduce the number of false 
positives that occur.  
In addition to this testing, the cost of upgrading level crossings should be another area, which is looked 
into further. There are no figures online for how much it would cost to upgrade different types of level 
crossing. This is most likely because every level crossing is slightly different in some way and each one 
would cost a different value to upgrade. There are also limited figures available for the cost of obstacle 
detection.  Upgrading a MCB-CCTV level crossing would cost the least as the barrier equipment is 
already in place, unlike an AHB crossing.    
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Appendix B. Spreadsheet of Individual and Collective Risk 
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Appendix C. Network Rail Level Crossing Closure List 
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Appendix D. Lincoln High Street level crossing images 
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Appendix E. Graph of train approximated arrival times 
 
 
For Scenario 3, the time taken to stop is a distance of 50m back from the level crossing. For Scenario 
1 and 2, it is the time taken for the train to reach the level crossing. At lower speeds this distance of 
50m is quite significant because it is the reason why Scenario 3 has a lower arrival time than Scenario 
2.  
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